85-871

No.

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
NOV 18 1985
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1985

ALBERT T. WILLARDO, M.D.,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

For Appeal:

(1) Whether a State statute requiring counsel to individually sign jury instructions and which is used to deny Petitioner's right to review on certain issues where the instructions were not so individually signed is repugnant to the guarantee of the fundamental right to due process of law as established by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

[In the event appeal is not granted as to question (1), it is prayed that the Court then grant writ of certiorari as to question (1).]

For writ of certiorari:

(2) Whether the trial Court's holding that a state statute taking effect two years following the claimed offense and reducing

the number of jurors from twelve to six in Petitioner's trial on a criminal offense of theft violates the ex post facto provisions of Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.

(3) Whether a criminal indictment failing to state the alleged offense with sufficient certainty so as to leave the Petitioner to guess how, when, where and with whom in calendar year 1978 an alleged offense occurred is so vague as to violate the guarantee of Petitioner's fundamental right to due process of law as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

PARTIES AFFECTED

Appellant-Defendant Below: Albert T. Willardo, M.D.

Appellee-Plaintiff Below: State of Indiana by and through its representative parties: Jack F. Crawford, Prosecutor of Lake County, Indiana and Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General for the State of Indiana.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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No.

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vs.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Your Petitioner, Albert T. Willardo, respectfully prays that appeal be granted to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana in the above case, and/or in the alternative your Petitioner prays that a writ

of certiorari be issued to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana in the above case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals of Indiana under Appeal Number 4-883A269 is attached as Appendix A.

The Supreme Court of Indiana denied Petition to Transfer by memorandum order without opinion which is attached as Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from judgment of conviction of a Class A misdemeanor of theft (conversion) under the laws of the State of Indiana by the Lake Superior Court, Criminal Division, Lake County, Indiana, on March 3, 1983.

An appeal was taken in a timely fashion and as provided by law to the Court of Appeals of Indiana, who affirmed the trial

Court's judgment in a memorandum decision on March 27, 1985. Petitioner filed his petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeals of Indiana, which was denied. Petitioner then timely filed his petition for transfer to the Supreme Court of Indiana, which petition was denied by an Order without opinion on September 17, 1985. No further appeal can be taken in the state court.

As to the question presented for appeal, this Court's jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(2). If considered for writ of certiorari, then jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. 1257(3).

With regard to the two questions presented for writ of certiorari, this Court's jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(3).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1

"No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex

post facto law. . . ."

Amendment XIV, Section 1

". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . ."

STATE STATUTES INVOLVED

Indiana Code, I.C. 35-37-2-2(6)

* * *

"If the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, or his counsel desires special instructions to be given to the jury, these instructions must be:

(A) reduced to writing;

(B) numbered;

(C) signed by the party, or his attorney, who is requesting the special instructions; and

(D) delivered to the Court;

before the commencement of the argument."

Indiana Code I.C. 35-37-1-1

(a) The jury venire called by a court may be used in civil or criminal cases (b) If a defendant is charged with:

(1) murder, a Class A Felony, a Class B felony or a Class C. felony, the jury shall consist of twelve (12) qualified jurors unless the defendant and prosecuting attorney agree to a lesser number; or

(2) any other crime, the jury shall consist of six (6) qualified jurors."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Albert T. Willardo, and his family live in Highland, Indiana. He is a medical doctor licensed in the State of Indiana, who also obtained a law degree and subsequently was admitted to practice before the bar of the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana. Petitioner never actively practiced law.

In 1976, Petitioner was elected to the office of County Coroner in Lake County, Indiana, as a reform candidate.

During Petitioner's successful campaign for re-election in the spring of 1980, Willie Hearns, a former Lake County Deputy Coroner and then candidate for the office of Coroner, publicly accused Petitioner of corruptive practices as the incumbent Coroner. These accusations and an investigation by a local newspaper led to an audit of the Coroner's budget by the Indiana State Board of Accounts and the formation of a Special Grand Jury in

September, 1980, only two months prior to the general election. The Grand Jury was specifically empowered to examine the allegations of corruption within the Coroner's office, and during its two year life it met on only nine occasions (days or parts of days). Among other witnesses, it heard basically one witness testify to practices in the Coroner's office by which Petitioner had augmented his campaign fund with county disbursements for false mileage claims. This witness was Shirley Hawkins (Petitioners former office manager who was fired over one year prior to any accusations of corruptive practices). Each time the six month term of the Grand Jury was about to end, new life was breathed into it by the County Prosecutor requesting and being granted extensions. On September 3, 1982, only two days before the final extension was to run out, the Grand Jury indicted

Petitioner for theft.

Curiously, although the Grand Jury took two years and although Shirley Hawkins was called back a second time for testimony before the Grand Jury for the expressed purpose of pinpointing the dates of the alleged offenses, the indictment only generally referred to the entire calendar year of 1978 without specifying any dates or places and then merely parroted the language of the statute under which Petitioner was charged without specifying the illegal acts. The sufficiency of this indictment was challenged by a Pre-Trial Motion to Dismiss which was overruled by the trial court. It was then raised again on appeal (App. A-30) and denied by memorandum decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals (App. A-32).

Willie Hearns, the unsuccessful candidate against the Petitioner in 1980, who initiated the investigation, was never called before the Special Grand Jury and was never

produced to testify at trial.

At the outset of trial, the Court ordered, over Petitioner's objection, that Petitioner would be given a six man jury pursuant to I. C. 35-37-1-1, which became effective law in Indiana on September 1, 1982 (two days prior to the indictment) and not a twelve man jury which was in effect at the time of the alleged offense in 1978. (App. A-3). Thereafter, Petitioner asserted this as error on appeal (App. A-13) which was denied by the Indiana Court of Appeals in its memorandum decision (App. A-21).

At trial, Shirley Hawkins testified under a grant of immunity with regard to the diversion of county funds into Petitioner's campaign account. Hawkins claimed a meeting occurred between Willardo, Charles Smith (who was Willardo's former chief deputy) and herself at which time a scheme was hatched to file false mileage claims with the County

Auditor and then deposit that money in Willardo's campaign account. Smith, although repeatedly threatened and intimidated by the Prosecuting Attorney's office during the Grand Jury and even indicted for perjury, consistently denied any such meeting was had or any scheme thus hatched. Following conviction of the Petitioner, Smith's perjury charge was dismissed.

The law provided for mileage to be paid to the Coroner and others upon presenting a list of actual miles traveled. In fact, the Petitioner did sign one mileage claim form in blank at the instance of Hawkins. All of the other claims filed bore either a forged signature or a signature stamp.

According to Hawkins, this scheme was developed to get more money for Petitioner. The evidence showed however that had Petitioner filed the claims with the actual mileage traveled and had Hawkins not filed the false claims, Petitioner would have

recovered substantially more money.

Petitioner denied any wrongdoing by testifying he had no knowledge of a scheme to falsify the claims for mileage; that he believed he was entitled to travel expense but was unaware of the procedure to be followed to obtain same; that he had delegated the duty of handling the travel expense and believed they were doing it properly; and that any money in his campaign account was, in any event, used primarily for official Coroner's expenses.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court refused to instruct the jury on the defense of mistake of fact as tendered by Petitioner (App. A-36) and then compounded that error by instructing the jury that theft means "misappropriation" (App. A-37). This was again raised in Petitioner's Motion to Correct Errors (App. A-28) and on appeal (App. A-28), which was also denied by the

Indiana Court of Appeals (App. A-30).

On February 9, 1983, the jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. On March 3, the Court heard arguments, considered a presentence report together with petitions on behalf of Petitioner signed by 3,500 persons and entered judgment against the Petitioner on a Class A misdemeanor sentencing him to one year in prison, which sentence was suspended. The Petitioner was then placed on probation for one year with the condition that he resign from public office within 90 days and make restitution to the County in the sum of $4,299.70. Petitioner complied with these terms.

Thereafter an appeal was initiated as provided by the law of the State of Indiana and on March 27, 1985, the Indiana Court of Appeals rendered its memorandum decision affirming the judgment of the lower Court. A motion for rehearing was timely filed and denied and a Motion for Transfer to the

Supreme Court of Indiana was timely made and denied by that Court on September 17, 1985.

REASONS FOR GRANTING APPEAL

A STATE STATUTE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE FOR AN ORDERLY PROCESSING OF PAPERWORK DURING A TRIAL WAS USED BY THE INDIANA COURT OF APPEALS TO DENY PETITIONER HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND FAIR APPEAL.

The Supreme Court of Indiana by denying petition to transfer to review the memorandum decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals in the above case held that errors of law raised on appeal and pertaining to the failure of the trial Court to give certain written instructions are waived on appeal unless it can be shown that the trial counsel signed not only the request for tendered instructions but also each and every instruction so tendered. The Court of Appeals of Indiana cited ruling precedent in the State of Indiana of Askew vs. State,

(1982), _____ Ind. App. _____, 435 N. E. 2nd 1350. The Askew decision as applied to the instant case, interpreted Indiana State Statute I.C. 35-37-2-2 to mean that if the party did not comply explicity with that statute, there could be no giving of such instructions, and further there could be no remedy on appeal. Such a ruling, would seem to fly in the face of the right of the Petitioner to a fair trial and fair appeal.

It is fundamental that every litigant, even in the civil arena, is entitled to have the jury instructed on the theory of his case (defense). In this case, petitioner's defense rested primarly on mistake of fact, an instruction on which the trial court refused. On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals, citing I.C. 35-37-2-2 as interpreted in Askew held that any error in such refusal was waived because petitioner and his trial counsel failed to individually sign their

tendered instructions.

It is urged that such an application of the doctrine of waiver should not be applied in a criminal case where our courts have a duty to ensure that essential instructions be given and thereby bar reversal where (as here) petitioner was convicted in the absence of such instructions.

Similarly, in Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, a state procedure was challenged which did not allow counsel to impeach his own witness. This court held that the challenged procedure could not bar rights under the "confrontation" clause of the Sixth Amendment made applicable to the states through the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Neither should the statute here be permitted to deny petitioner a fair trial and fair appeal.

In the event direct appeal on this question is not granted, then Petitioner

seeks the granting of a writ of certiorari on this issue. The Indiana Court of Appeals failed to apply the test prescribed in South Carolina Highway Department vs. Barnwell Brothers, (1938), 310 U.S. 177 and Dean Milk Company vs. City of Madison, (1952), 340 U.S. 349.

Both South Carolina and Dean Milk Company cases challenge state or state subdivision action invoking the "commerce clause". In both instances the test applied was one of balancing the state's interest through its police powers against the constitutional rights of the individual. It is urged that the same test should be applied here. It would appear that the state's interest in the statute involved is in maintaining the orderly processing of paperwork during litigation as opposed to the Petitioner's interest in getting a fair trial and fair appeal as a matter of due process of

law as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Such an encroachment of state power on individual constitutional rights should not and cannot be tolerated.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE TRIAL COURTS APPLICATION OF A NEW SIX-MAN JURY STATUTE NOT IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE WORKED TO DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF A TWELVE-MAN JURY IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST EX POST FACT LAWS.

With regard to the Indiana State Statute providing for a six member jury which became effective just prior to Petitioner's indictment but was not effective at the time of the alleged offense, the Court of Appeals of Indiana decided a federal question in a way in conflict with decisions of another

state court of last resort. Given the facts of this case, the state courts finding ex post facto violations are McSears vs. State, (1981), ____ Ga. ____, 273 S. E. 2nd 847; and Commonwealth vs. A Juvenile, (1981), ____ Mass. ____, 425 N. E. 2nd 294. State courts holding to the contrary and often confusing ex post facto with due process are: State vs. McIntosh, (1975), ____ Ariz. ____, 532 P. 2nd 188; State vs. Maresca, (1977), ____ Conn. ____, 377 A. 2nd 1330; Iseton vs. State, (1984), ____ Ind. App. ____, 472 N. E. 2nd 642; and the unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals of Indiana in the above case.

Additionally, it is urged that the Court of Appeals of Indiana in the instant case decided a federal question in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court, to-wit: Thompson vs. Utah, (1898), 170 U.S. 343 and Ballew vs. Georgia, (1978), 435 U.S. 223.

Thompson decided that there was an ex post facto violation in circumstances similar to those which exist here and that the number of jurors was a substantive right. Ballew reinforces the substantive right doctrine where it indicates that decreasing jury size carries with it increased risk of an erroneous verdict and that jury size is more than a question of procedure. Ballew at pp. 232-35.

For most of our country's history, this Court has held that a criminal defendant in a state court did not have a right to a jury trial. Many states, however, did grant such a right but sometimes specified less than twelve jurors.

Duncan vs. Louisiana, (1968), 391 U.S. 145, decided that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a jury trial in a state court criminal case. Following the Duncan decision, the question arose as to how many members constituted a valid jury. Williams

vs. Florida, (1969), 399 U.S. 78, held that less than twelve jurors did not violate due process. Problems then developed where state statutes were enacted after the Williams decision providing for less than twelve jurors, but where at the time of the offense Defendant was entitled to twelve. In many of these instances, at the time of trial, the Defendant got a jury of less than twelve jurors. This factual situation (which is the one presented here for review) has created conflicting decisions of state courts of last resort and begs resolution by this Court.

It is here submitted that the question was answered in Thompson vs. Utah, (1898), 170 U.S. 343, where a Defendant committed a crime while Utah was still a territory thus entitling the Defendant to twelve jurors, which he got. The Defendant was convicted and the conviction was later reversed on other grounds. By the time the retrial took

place in state court, Utah had become a state and the state constitution provided for trial by jury but with less than twelve jurors. As here, the Defendant demanded twelve but was given less than twelve. On appeal to this Court, the conviction was reversed and it was held that the number of jurors was a substantive right. Thus, it continued giving Defendant a jury of less than twelve violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws under Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the United States.

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals of Indiana's relies upon Maxwell vs. Dow, (1900), 176 U.S. 581, for support that this court has determined that the number of jurors is a procedural right. We think their reliance is misplaced. In Maxwell, the Defendant was never entitled to twelve jurors as a matter of state law. He was in fact convicted by a jury of less than twelve and challenged that conviction arguing

that his jury had to be a jury of twelve as provided at common law. This Court held that there was no right to jury trial in a criminal case in state court, and, that due process is not offended by a jury of less than twelve.

Clearly, that is not the case here. In the instant case, as in Thompson, the Petitioner was entitled to a jury of twelve at the time of the offense, but at time of trial received a jury of less than twelve under authority of a subsequent statute. This is a clear violation of the ex post facto prohibition.

Writ of certiorari should be granted to inform state courts that Thompson is still the law and that such courts should not attempt to encroach on the authority of this Court by trying to overrule Thompson. The writ should likewise be granted to settle ex post facto cases of this kind as they have

occurred and are likely to occur many times again with the trend toward smaller juries.

II.

THE INDICTMENT RETURNED VERSUS PETITIONER WAS AS VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN AS TO DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

The Court of Appeals of Indiana in the instant case also decided a federal question in a way conflicting with applicable decisions of this Court, to-wit: United States vs. Cruikshank, (1875), 92 U.S. 542; United States vs. Carll, (1881), 105 U.S. 611; United States vs. Hess, (1888), 124 U.S. 483; Russell vs. United States, (1962) 369 U.S. 749; and Hamling vs. United States, (1974), 418 U.S. 87.

The earlier cases held that a charging instrument that merely parrots the language of the statute is insufficient and that it must state facts. The more recent cases

allow the language of the statute to be used, but require that other facts be stated so that the one charged has adequate notice to enable him to defend. Such facts are not provided in the indictment in the instant case. (App. 38)

It is urged here that it should be made clear to the states that indictments must be drafted showing sufficient facts to enable those charged to present an adequate defense. The standards set forth in the cases of this Court cited above in deciding that issue through construction of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment need to be imposed on the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully prays that the Petition for Appeal be granted and/or in the alternative that his petition for writ of

certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ALBERT T. WILLARDO, M.D., Appellant (Defendant Below)	)	
vs.	)	No. 4-883 A 269
STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)	)	

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LAKE COUNTY
The Honorable James L. Clement, Judge
Cause No. 4CR-191-982-763

MILLER, P.J.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Dr. Albert T. Willardo, former Coroner for Lake County, was indicted for and convicted of theft in the conversion of monies isued from county funds for fraudulent mileage claims and deposited into his personal campaign fund. Upon the jury's verdict, the trial court imposed a one-year sentence for a Class A misdemeanor theft offense (IND. CODE 35-50-2-7 (Supp. 1978)), suspended the sentence and placed Willardo on probation. He further ordered Willardo to resign his post within 90 days of judgment and to make restitution to Lake County in the amount of $4,229.70. Willardo opposes his conviction on various grounds, which, condensed to their essential features, attack: the indictment, the assemblage of a six- (rather than twelve-) member jury, the trial court's refusal to give tendered instructions, error in an instruction actually delivered, the failure to sequester the jury, and the denial of a motion in

limine. We have closely examined and researched these issues but conclude none are worthy of reversal. We affirm.

ISSUES

Willardo sets forth the following propositions for our consideration as errors constituting grounds for reversal:

The trial court erred in

1. overruling Willardo's Motion to Dismiss the indictment based on the prosecutor's means of conducting the Special Grand Jury that indicted him;

2. overruling Willardo's motion for a twelve-member jury;

3. not granting Willardo's request to sequester the jury.[1]

---

1. Willardo's eight other issues presented for our consideration were waived for one reason or another. We will address them at the conclusion of our decision on the properly presented issues listed above.

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FACTS

In the spring of 1980, one Willie Hearns, a former Lake County Deputy Coroner and then-candidate for the office of Coroner, publicly accused Willardo of corruptive practices as the incumbent Lake County coroner. These accusations and an investigation by a local newspaper led to an audit of the Coroner's budget by the Indiana State Board of Accounts and the formation of a special grand jury, in September, 1980. The grand jury was specifically empowered to examine the allegations of corruption within the Coroner's office, and during its two-year life, it heard various witnesses testifying to practices in the Coroner's office by which Willardo had augmented his campaign fund with county disbursements for false mileage claims. On September 3, 1982, the grand jury indicted Willardo for theft.

At trial, Shirley Hawkins and Charles Smith (Willardo's former office manager and

chief deputy, respectively) testified under grants of immunity with regard to the diversion of county funds into Willardo's campaign account. Hawkins stated that in the spring of 1978, Willardo began to complain that his campaign account was insufficient to support his expenses and planned activities and that the measly remuneration from the Coroner's salary hardly compensated for the grossly disproportionate cost of getting elected. As a consequence, when Smith suggested that a mileage line item in the Coroner's budget was rarely exhausted, Willardo directed that some method be utilized to rechannel these funds into his campaign account. More specifically, Hawkins was instructed to falsify and file mileage claims with the County Auditor for herself, Willardo and Smith, such claims being signed by either Willardo or herself. Willardo, of course, kept the money he received personally

while Hawkins and Smith would deposit their checks into their own accounts, then would kick back that money to Willardo by checks to the campaign fund for like amounts. A portion of the campaign account was used for the legitimate purposes of the Coroner's office and its activities; other amounts, however, were diverted to political and campaign contributions.

Willardo denied any wrongdoing by testifying he had no knowledge of the scheme to falsify the claims for mileage and that his campaign account was, in any event, used primarily for official Coroner's expenses. The jury evidently believed the damning testimony of Hawkins and Smith and that of other adverse witnesses, two of whom were funeral home directors who testified Willardo had never been to their establishments for autopsies although he had received mileage reimbursements for same. They found Willardo guilty of theft.

DECISION

Special Grand Jury

Willardo filed a motion to dismiss the indictment againt him, which in its supplemented form alleged he was denied his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, Willardo argues the indictment was faulty because of the grand jury's misconduct; specifically, he alleges it did not act duly and diligently in charging him for a 1978 offense in 1982, it did not protect its secrecy, and it became a forum for the intimidation of a State's witness. We find no error.

Our first inclination is to declare this issue waived. It is difficult for us to reconcile most of the arguments made here on appeal with those made in Willardo's motion to dismiss, and when any such differences in the motion and on appeal occur, we deem the issue waived. See Ind. Rules of Procedure,

Criminal Rule 3; Snelling v. State (1975), Ind.App., 326 N.E.2d 606. However, because it would take us nearly as long to extricate the properly preserved issues from those that have been waived as it would be to dispense with general merits of Willardo's claim, we will reach the primary issue -- whether the delay between the commission of the offense and the filing of the indictment, as caused by the two-year special grand jury investigation, was a sufficient denial of Willardo's due process rights to warrant dismissing said indictment.

Willardo's allegation of the grand jury's misconduct focus on his claims that the grand jury was convened and conducted solely to harrass him personally and was not convened for any legitimate purposes. Thus, he declares they acted too slowly, divulged numerous (but uncited) secret proceedings, and provided a platform for the prosecutor to intimidate a witness. As a consequence,

Willardo declares several prejudicial events followed, including two years of adverse publicity, the passage of time allowing a statutory change in the number of jurors from twelve to six, an absence of bank and personal records, and impairment of his memory of the events of the year in question (1978). On the assumption that the grand jury indeed conducted itself as Willardo alleges and that the aforementioned results occurred, we still must find no error because Willardo has not shown any actual prejudice to the defense of his case.

Willardo can establish a valid due process claim for the pre-indictment delay from 1978 to 1982, only if he can provide proof of actual prejudice resulting therefrom and sufficient invalid reason for the prosecutorial delay. See United States v. Lovasco (1977), 431 U.S. 783; McMorris v. State (1979), Ind.App., 392

N.E.2d 820. He has not even breached the requirements of proving the first of these factors -- actual prejudice.

Willardo has presented us with a list of events that, if true, bear with them the potential for prejudice, but "potential" prejudice is insufficient reason for quashing an indictment. It has long been the law of the land and this state that only actual prejudice will suffice for a dismissal. See, e.g., United States v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307; McMorris v. State, supra; Burress v. State (1977), Ind.App., 363 N.E.2d 1036; see also Rennert v. State (1975), Ind., 329 N.E.2d 595 (actual prejudice from irregularity of grand jury proceedings must be shown); State v. Hardy (1980), Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 313. Willardo's allegations of memory impairment, adverse publicity, and loss of records is nowhere supported in his arguments by any recital of their prejudicial effects on his case, and his contention that

the State gained a tactical advantage by filing its indictment after a jury statute became effective is countered below as being a nonprejudicial retroactive application of a trial procedure. Instead, Willardo attempts to persuade us with the mere declaration that the delay from the end of 1978 (the year of the offense) to his indictment in 1982, in conjunction with any and all "adverse" occurrences transpiring therein, was prejudicial. His efforts are fruitless.

The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar notion in the following fashion, upon a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment:

> "The 38-month delay between the end of the scheme charged in the indictment and the date the defendants were indicted did not extend beyond the period of the applicable statute of limitations here . . . . Nor have appellees demonstrated that the pre-indictment delay by the Government violated the Due Process Clause. No actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged or proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain

> some tactical advantage over appellees or to harrass them. Appellees rely solely on the real possibility of prejudice inherent in any extended delay: that memories will dim, witnesses become inaccessible, and evidence be lost. In light of the applicable statute of limitations, however, these possibilities are not in themselves enough to demonstrate that appellees cannot receive a fair trial and to therefore justify the dismissal of the indictment."

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 325-26. As this opinion continues, the Court opined that events at trial may well demonstrate actual prejudice also; however, Willardo has not so demonstrated, from any aspect of the proceedings, that he was denied due process in the formulation of his defense. We find this particularly applicable inasmuch as Willardo's defense constituted a blunt denial of any wrongdoing as opposed to the defensive arguments, such as an alibi, which could wither in the passage of time. Thus, the trial court did not err when it refused to grant Willardo's motion to dismiss the

indictment. See, e.g., McMorris v. State, supra, 392 N.E.2d 820 (failure to show actual prejudice despite several events in which prejudice potentially inhered).

Six-Member Jury

Willardo was charged with an offense committed in 1978, but he was not indicted until September 3, 1982. Two days before the indictment, on September 1, IND. CODE 35-37-1-1 became effective, thereby authorizing a jury of six to try Willardo's Class D felony theft charge. At the time Willardo committed the offense, however, only a jury of twelve would have been authorized. See IND. CODE 35-1-30-1 (Supp. 1978). He now contends that the trial court's application of I.C. 35-37-1-1 (six jurors) over his motion for a twelve-member jury was an unconstitutional exercise of an ex post facto law, denying him his right to a twelve-member jury. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, Section 10; IND. CONST. art. 1 Section 24 ("No ex post

facto law shall ever be passed.") A thorough study of the subject and a recent case from this court, Iseton v. State (1984), Ind.App., 472 N.E.2d 643, reveals to us the trial court did not err.

The prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws is without cavil and was recently treated by this court in Finney v. State (1979), Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 477:

> "The plain and obvious meaning of this prohibition is, that the legislature shall not pass any law, after a fact done by any citizen, which shall have relation to that fact, so as to punish that which was innocent when done; or to add to the punishment of that which was criminal; or to increase the malignancy of a crime; or to retrench the rules of evidence, so as to make conviction more easy. Strong v. State (1822), 1 Blackford 193. The ex post facto clause [U.S. Const. art. 4, Section 10] applies only to laws which deprive a person accused or convicted of a crime of a substantial personal right which he would have had at the time he committed the offense. Thus, the inquiry turns on whether the statute changed a's substantial right' or 'mere procedure.' Warner v. State (1976), Ind., 354 N.E. 2d 178."

Id. at 480. The main thrust of this doctrine is to deny the State the power to more easily convict defendants by changing a statute and thereby rescinding a substantial right such defendants possessed at the time of the offense. But there is no prohibition upon a change in a defendant's right which smacks of procedure only. "A litigant has no vested right in a remedy or mode of procedure, and, where a law relates to matters of procedure merely, and does not deprive the accused of any substantial protection, it is not ex post facto." In re Petitions to Transfer Appeals (1931), Ind., 174 N.E. 812, 817; Watts v. State (1950), Ind., 95 N.E.2d 570. Thus, our courts have found no ex post facto prohibition when offenses occurred before the imposition of procedural laws, such as the rape shield statute (Finney v. State, supra), a statute governing moral character evidence for impeachment purposes (Robinson v. State

(1882), 84 Ind. 452), punishment changed from "stripes" to imprisonment (Strong v. State, supra, 1 Blackf. 193), alteration in State's remedy of charging offense against accessories (Sage v. State (1891), Ind., 26 N. E. 667), and transferral of criminal cases pending on appeal from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals (In re Petition to Transfer Appeals, supra). There was, however, error in applying a statute which removed an alternative form of punishment from a defendant. Warner v. State, supra, 354 N.E.2d 178. Our inquiry then must be to determine if the trial court's use of a six-member jury denied to Willardo a substantive right, which, to the State's advantage, made it easier to convict him.

There is no dispute that the right to a trial by jury is constitutionally guaranteed to state criminal defendants vis a vix the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), 391 U.S. 145.

However, such right to trial by jury does not mandate a panel of twelve members but may include as few as six and still be within the constitutional requirements. Williams v. Florida (1970), 399 U.S. 78; Castro v. State (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 1141; O'Brien v. State (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 1266; Smith v. State (1978), Ind.App., 373 N.E.2d 1112. On the other hand, statistical data reveals a decreasing reliability of jury verdicts commensurate with a decrease in jury members such that any number less than six is a violation of the right to jury trial. Ballew v. Georgia (1978), 435 U.S. 223 (reaffirming Williams v. Florida, supra, but drawing the line at no less than six-member juries). The distilled issue here then is whether a decrease in jury size from twelve to six is a deprivation of a substantial right reflected in the decisions of twelve jurors. We think not. See Iseton

v. State, supra.

Willardo relies on Thompson v. Utah (1898), 170 U.S. 343, for the proposition that the trial court's implementation of I. C. 35-37-1-1 (six jurors) violates the ex post facto prinicple. In that case, the Supreme Court declared that the U.S. Constitution, by its mere use of the word "jury," required a panel of twelve members as at common law. Thus, the defendant, who had been originally charged and first tried under the Sixth Amendment when Utah was still a territory, was entitled to a retrial by that same number after Utah attained statehood, rather than by eight jurors as allowed by Utah's new state constitution. The Supreme Court then reversed the defendant's second conviction by eight as being within the Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws. At first blush, Willardo appears to be correct, but we believe his reliance upon Thompson v. Utah today is misplaced.

The underpinnings of the Thompson case, that a jury of twelve is constitutionally mandated, has been eroded by the Supreme Court's opinion in Williams v. Florida, supra, 399 U.S. 78. In that decision, the Court declared that the twelve-member requirement was not "an indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment," id. at 100, and that the historical common law jury of twelve was more an "historical accident" than a rationally conceived protection for a defendant:

> "[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence. The performance of this role is not a function of the particular number of the body that makes up the jury. To be sure, the number should probably be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community. But we find little reason to

> think that these goals are in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved when the jury numbers six, than when it numbers 12 -- particularly if the requirement of unanimity is retained. And, certainly the reliability of the jury as a factfinder hardly seems likely to be a function of its size."

Id. at 100-01. Therefore, we are led to conclude that the right to a trial by jury is indeed a substantial right but not one that hinges upon any specific number (so long as there are no fewer than six, Ballew v. Georgia, supra, 435 U.S. 223). See State ex rel. City of Columbus v. Boyland (1979), 58 Ohio.St.2d 490, 391 N.E.2d 324; contra, Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (1981), 384 Mass. 390, 425 N.E.2d 294.

We think the Supreme Court itself clearly expressed itself on this matter in a case which has been often mischaracterized, Maxwell v. Dow (1900), 176 U.S. 581. In that case, decided two years after Thompson v. Utah, supra, 170 U.S. 343, the Utah constitutional provision allowing eight-

member juries was directly confronted in an attack by writ of habeas corpus. While upholding the practice under due process reasoning which is archaic today, the Court nonetheless referred to the propriety of the eight-member state jury as a procedural matter in the following manner:

> "[T]he state has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution. The legislation in question is not, in our opinion, open to either of these objections."

Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. at 605 (emphasis added). We conclude that Willardo was not denied any substantial right when he was tried by a six- rather than a twelve-member jury but rather was subjected to a change in procedure only. In the absence of any change in a substantial right, there was no ex post facto prohibition involved. See State v. McIntosh (1975), 23 Ariz.App. 246, 532 P.2d

188; State v. Maresca (1977), 173 Conn. 450, 377 A.2d 1330; Iseton v. State, supra, contra, McSears v. State (1981), 247 Ca, 48, 273 S.E.2d 847.[2]

---

2. To the extent that Castro v. State (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E. 2d 1141, conflicts with this decision, we disagree with it. In Castro, the Third District of this court reversed a conviction upon a six-member jury verdict delivered in superior court, declaring such was harmful error. However, a closer look at the facts of that case reveals that the statutes involved allowed six-person juries in criminal cases heard in county courts. See IND. CODE 35-1-30-1 (Supp. 1979); IND. CODE 33-10.5-3-1 (1976). The defendant was only allowed six jurors although he was tried in superior court where a jury of twelve was required by statute. I.C. 35-1-30-1 ("must"). This court without exlpanation, found this to be "harmful error." The best explanation for such result we believe to be, not in any argument that the defendant was riven of any substantial right, but in the rationale of Otte v. Tessman (1981), Ind., 426 N.E.2d 660, whereby prejudice is presumed and harmful error occurs when a trial court fails to abide by mandatory procedures for conducting trials. Such reasoning, we believe, better supports the point of Castro and aligns better with the case law on the ex post facto doctrine discussed in the case at bar.

It is also pertinent to our discussion of this change in law to observe that Willardo's alleged right to a trial by twelve

Sequestering Jury

Next, Willardo argues the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion to sequester the jury. In said motion, Willardo alleged the jury had been and would be exposed to publicity prejudicial to his

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(Continued from previous page)

jurors is not preserved by the savings clause present in the act repealing I.D. 35-1-30-1. See 1981 Ind.Acts, P.L. 298 Section 9(b). Such savings clause assures that the repealer "does not affect any rights or liabilities accrued, or any proceedings begun, before September 1, 1982. . . ." Assuming that this clause even applies to Willardo for a proceeding commenced before September 1, 1982 (the indictment was not issued until September 3), our case law clearly denies any implication that Willardo's statutory twelve-member jury is saved after repeal.

As we described above, Maxwell v. Dow (1900), 176 U.S. 581, clearly describes the specific number of jurors as a matter of procedure only. Indiana cases unmistakably stand for the proposition that criminal defendants have no vested rights in a mode of procedure, In re Petitions to Transfer Appeals (1931), Ind., 174 N.E. 812, and cannot rely on savings clauses to maintain such procedure past repeal. Greichunos v. State (1983), Ind.App., 457 N.E.2d 615. Therefore, Willardo's alleged right is not protected by any savings clause.

case. He attached thereto numerous newspaper articles, which had appeared before trial about the allegations, the Grand Jury, and various other adverse items concerning the ongoing investigation into activities in the Lake County Coroner's office. However, at no time has Willardo indicated what material was published during the trial nor how it affected the jury's impartiality and deliberations. We thus find no error.

The seperation or sequestration of a jury during trial is a choice left to the sound discretion of the trial court. IND. CODE 35-37-2-4; Brollinger v. State (1980), Ind., 408 N.E.2d 1228; Roberts v. State (1978), Ind., 373 N.E.2d 1193. In attacking such discretion, Willardo has not even made any record of actual publicity during the trial to show what the jury may have encountered, much less any showing the jury was actually so exposed so that we can determine if the trial court erred. See id.

All his argument amounts to is the contention that a generally adverse trial atmosphere existed that could not help but permeate the jury. As our supreme court has declared, this is simply not enough:

> "[W]e accept as true appellant's claim that his trial drew many spectators and received extensive press coverage from local and state media. However, these facts alone do not show an abuse of discretion by the trial court for failing to sequester the jury. Appellant has not shown that any jurors were actually exposed to the publicity or any other extraneous influences during the trial. His conclusion that the jury was improperly influenced because it was exposed to the mere possibility of contact with outside influences or to any allegedly prejudicial publicity is speculative at best."

Drollinger v. State, supra, 408 N.E.2d at 1236. Indeed, as in Drollinger, the trial court here took care to ensure the jury maintained its impartiality.

After the jury had been selected, the trial court delivered the following preliminary instruction:

"During the voir dire, each of you indicated to the Court and to the attorneys that you had not heard of the matter prior to today or that if you did, it would not make any difference in arriving at a fair verdict. You also indicated that you did not know any of the people that may be called upon during the trial. If, during the trial you should become aware that you have heard of the matter prior to today, you are to notify the Court immediately of that."

Record, p. 1102. At the end of each day, the court admonished the jury in a manner that varied only slightly from the following:

"Alright, again, we do anticipate that there will be coverage given the trial here thruout the week. Now if you are going to read your paper, you are to give it to another member of your family, have then go thru it carefully and if there is anything at all about the trial, they are to remove it from the paper before giving it to you. Do you all understand that? You are not to listen to the local radio stations here, during the evening and you understand that you are not to talk to anybody nor to allow anybody to talk with you about the matter. The alternative again, would be to keep you together thruout the week. I felt that would not be appropriate or proper. Again, we have to rely upon you to follow the admonition of the Court. It is vitally important that you not hear anything, that you not be exposed to anything about the matter, other than what you

> hear here in the courtroom. Do you all understand that? Any of you have any questions about that?"

Record, pp. 1229, 1453, 1652, 1886, 2156. A similar admonishment not to communicate with anybody about the case was given at each noon break of record. Record, pp. 1285, 1367, 1739, 1953. Each morning (except after the weekend recess) the court questioned each juror individually regarding whether they had been exposed to any trial publicity, and each responded in the negative. Record, pp. 1230, 1454, 1653, 1887. We believe the trial court adequately protected the integrity of the jury by its vigilance, and we find no abuse of discretion in its refusal to sequester. See Prollinger v. State, supra, 408 N. E. 2d 1228; Roberts v. State, supra, 373 N.E.2d 1103.

Waiver

Willardo raised eight additional issues in his brief, which, for one reason or another, were waived. Four issues were

waived for failure to cite any authority whatsoever in his appellate brief. See Ind. Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7); Smith v. State (1982), Ind., 432 N.E.2d 1363; Hobbs v. State (1983), Ind.App., 451 N.E.2d 356. These waived errors are whether

> --"[t]he Trial Court erred in giving its instruction number fourteen concerning alleged misappropriation of other monies for which Dr. Willardo was not charged."3
>
> --"[t]he Trial Court erred in refusing to give Dr. Willardo's instruction number four which differentiated between direct and circumstantial evidence."
>
> --"[t]the Trial Court erred in overruling Dr. Willardo's Motion in limine."

---

3. Willardo did cite two statutes concerning this issue in his reply brief, but rather than ultimately determine whether such citation to authority fulfills the mandate of Ind. Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7), we point out two other instances of error: 1) Willardo failed to set out his verbatim objection to this instruction in his brief, see Parks v. State (1979), Ind., 389 N.E.2d 286; 2) when we searched the record for said objection, we found it was so general as to present nothing for our review. See, e.g., Green v. State (1983), Ind., 451 N.E.2d 41.

--"Dr. Willardo did not receive a fair trial within the meaning of the Due Process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."

Appellant's Brief, pp. 2 - 3.

Three other waived issues all concern alleged error in the trial court's refusal to give Willardo's tendered instructions numbered 1, 3, and 6. Willardo erred here in failing to comply with IND. CODE 35-37-2-2(6):

> "(6) If the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, or his counsel desires special instructions to be given to the jury, these instructions must be:
>
> (A) reduced to writing;
>
> (B) numbered;
>
> (C) signed by the party, or his attorney, who is requesting the special instructions; and
>
> (D) delivered to the court;
>
> before the commencement of the argument. A charge of the court or any special instructions, when written and given by the court under this subdivision, may not be orally qualified, modified, or in any manner orally explained to the jury by the court."

In particular, neither he nor his attorney signed the questioned instructions. Thus, any error based thereon is waived, Askew v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 1350, and is not preserved by signing the cover sheet attached thereto. See Harding v. State (1984), Ind., 457 N.E.2d 1098.

Willardo's final issue alleges the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to state the target offense with certainty. The entire argument he formulates in his brief, after setting out the indictment, is as follows:

> "While it is true that some latitude should be permitted, in regard to certainty, a child could have done a better job of drafting. No one charged in this fashion could read this and understand what he was charged with. It was obviously hurriedly drawn just before the Special Grand Jury expired, and thereafter the State could not amend the indictment as far as substance. Dr. Willardo timely filed his Motion to Dismiss on those grounds, but it was denied by the Court without comment.

(Tr. V.2, pp. 336, 340)."

Appellant's Brief, p. 21. This argument is insufficient in informing us where, why, and in what manner the indictment is deficient regarding the specificity of the charges and how Willardo was prejudiced. We will not make his argument for him so the issue is waived. A.R. 8.3 (A)(7); McManus v. State (1982), Ind., 433 N.E.2d 775. Regardless, we fail to see how any future harm can come to Willardo simply because the indictment, if deficient at all, charged him with embezzlement generally between January 1, 1978, through December 31, 1978, although specifically from Account #001-070-00213 of the Lake County Coroner's budget. Each transaction could have been stated separately, but we do not believe this failure can or will subject Willardo to double jeopardy. His conviction on this general charge shields him from additional charges arising from furthr transactions in

that account during this time period. "[W]here the offense for which the accused was previously convicted was in fact a continuing one, such as keeping a house of ill fame or operating a place where liquor was illegally sold, though the convictions were predicated upon proscribed activities on a single day, such convictions would bar subsequent prosecutions for the same type of proscribed activity at any time before the state's pleading was filed." 8 I.L.F. Criminal Law Section 98, 201-02 (1971) (footnotes omitted). There was no error.

The foregoing is the sum and substance of Willardo's appeal (no attack having been made on the sufficiency of the evidence itself), and we find no issue to support reversal. We affirm.

CONOVER and YOUNG, JJ. CONCUR.

APP. B

STATE OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS,46204
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
AND COURT OF APPEALS

MARJORIE H. O'LAUGHLIN, CLERK
217 State House Telephone 232-1930

No. 4-883A269

Albert T. Willardo, M.D. vs. State of Indiana

You are hereby notified that the Supreme Court has on this day Appellants petition for Transfer is hereby DENIED without Opinion. All Justices Concur.

Given, C.J.

Please acknowledge receipt of this notice in order that our records may show that you have been notified of this action.

WITNESS my name and the seal of said Court, this 17 day of Sept, 1985.

/s/_____
Clerk, Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals

APP. C
In The

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

Albert T. Willardo,
Defendant and Appellant below

vs.

State of Indiana,
Plaintiff and Appellee below

Cause No.: 4- 333 A 269 November 11, 1985

NOTICE OF PETITION FOR APPEAL

and

NOTICE OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Comes now Andrew D. Jackson as counsel for Appellant-Petitioner Dr. Albert T. Willardo and pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States serves this NOTICE upon the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Indiana and the Honorable Justices thereof to inform the Clerk and Honorable Justices that he will file in the Supreme Court of the United States a Petition for Appeal from the Supreme Court of Indiana on one question of law and a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Indiana

on several questions of law in response to a denial of Motion for Transfer rendered by the Supreme Court of Indiana on September 17, 1985 ((copy attached)).

ANDREW D. JACKSON
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WHITING, INDIANA 46394
Attorney for Appellant-
Petitioner
Dr. Albert T. Willardo
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/s/

cc:
Clerk of the Supreme Court
of the United States;

Attorney General Linley Pearson

Lake County Prosecutor
Jack Crawford

Defendant's Tendered Instruction Number 1

The crime charged in this case is a serious crime which requires proof of specific intent before the defendant can be convicted. Specific intent, as the term implies, means more than the general intent to commit the act. To establish specific intent the State must prove that the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law. Such intent may be determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

An act or a failure to act is "knowingly" done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.

Court's Final Instruction Number 14

Evidence has been admitted regarding the over-the-counter sale of certain documents in the Coroner's Office, where the proceeds went into the account of the Committee to Elect Dr. Willardo. This evidence has been admitted solely as it may relate to the defendant's knowledge or lack of knowledge of the alleged misappropriation of money from the Travel Expense Account as charged in the Indictment and for no other purpose.

The Defendant is not on trial for the alleged misappropriation of document fees. He is on trial for the alleged misappropriation of money from the Travel Expense Account in 1978 and your verdict must be either guilty or not guilty of that charge only.

APP. F

INDICTMENT

The Grand Jurors of Lake County, in the State of Indiana, good and lawful men, duly and legally impaneled, charged and sworn to inquire into felonies and certain misdemeanors in and for the body of said County of Lake, in the name and by the authority of the State of Indiana, on their oaths present that one ALBERT T. WILLARDO, M.D. of said County, on the January 1, 1978 through December 31, 1978, inclusive, at said County and State aforesaid, did then and there did knowingly or intentionally exert unauthorized control in a manner or to an extent other than that to which the other person has consented over property of Lake County, Indiana, a body politic or corporate, to-wit: money from the Lake County, Indiana, Coroner's Budget (Calendar year 1978) Account Number 001-070-00213 (Traveling Expenses), with the intent to deprive the said Lake County, Indiana, a body politic or corporate, of the value and use thereof. . .

No. 85-871

(2)

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
DEC 20 1985
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1985

ALBERT T. WILLARDO, M.D.,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Respondent.

ON APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

MOTION TO DISMISS JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Whether I.C. §35-37-2-2(6) (Burns Repl. 1985) which requires, among other things, that either a party or his attorney sign requested special instructions, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

II. Did the trial court err by overruling the Petitioner's objection to trial before a six-person jury which was based upon the assertion that the court's application of I.C. §35-37-1-1 (Burns Repl. 1985) which provides for a six-member jury violated the constitutional protections against *ex post facto* laws?

III. Did the trial court err by denying the Petitioner's motion to dismiss which was based upon the assertion that the indictment was vague and uncertain?

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No. 85-871

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1985

ALBERT T. WILLARDO, M.D.,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Respondent.

ON APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

MOTION TO DISMISS JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Respondent, the State of Indiana, respectfully requests the Court to dismiss the jurisdictional statement which seeks review of an opinion of the Court of Appeals of Indiana since substantial federal questions have not been raised.

OPINION BELOW

The Court of Appeals of Indiana entered an opinion in this cause on March 27, 1985. The opinion is set forth in

Petitioner's Appendix at A-1 and is not officially reported. On May 23, 1985, the Court of Appeals of Indiana denied the Petitioner's petition for rehearing. The unpublished order of the Supreme Court of Indiana denying the Petitioner's petition for transfer was entered on September 17, 1985 (Petitioner's Appendix at A-33).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The Petitioner, Dr. Albert T. Willardo, a former coroner of Lake County, Indiana, was convicted and sentenced for theft due to converting monies issued from county funds for fraudulent mileage claims and depositing the monies into his personal campaign fund.

The Petitioner was indicted on September 3, 1982 for a theft committed in 1978. In 1978, a jury panel of twelve members was authorized. I.C. §35-1-30-1 (1977). However, on September 1, 1982, prior to the indictment, IC §35-37-1-1 (Burns Repl. 1985) became effective and authorized a jury of six qualified jurors to hear the Petitioner's Class D felony theft charge. In this case, a panel of six jurors was assembled. Prior to trial, however, the Petitioner filed a motion for a twelve-member jury which was denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Indiana, the Court concluded that the Petitioner was not denied any substantial right when he was tried by a six-member rather than a twelve-member jury and there was no *ex post facto* prohibition involved (Petitioner's Appendix at A-13-22).

In addition, prior to trial, the Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment which was based upon the assertion that the indictment failed to state the offense with certainty. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Indiana, the Court dismissed the Petitioner's claim and ruled that he failed to specifically state in what manner the indictment was deficient (Petitioner's Appendix at A-31).

Finally, after the presentation of evidence, the Petitioner tendered several final instructions which the trial court refused. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Indiana declined to address the Petitioner's allegation of error regarding the refusal of the instructions since he failed to comply with I.C. §35-37-2-2(6) (Burns Repl. 1985) which requires that either a party or his attorney must sign the requested instruction(s) (Petitioner's Appendix at A-29-30).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The United States Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review the Petitioner's argument regarding the constitutionality of I.C. §35-37-2-2(6) (Burns Repl. 1985) which requires, among other things, that either a party or his attorney sign requested special final instructions, since this contention was not raised, briefed, or argued in the Indiana appellate courts.

Further, the Petitioner has failed to present a substantial federal question regarding his claim that the indictment which charged him with theft is vague. A mere reference to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is insufficient to support a claim that the amendment has been violated.

Finally, the Petitioner's trial by a jury of six persons was not in violation of the constitutional prohibition against *ex post facto* laws even though at the time the theft was committed, the Petitioner had the right to be tried by a jury of twelve. The Petitioner was subjected only to a change in procedure and no *ex post facto* prohibition was involved. Because the jurisdictional statement does not raise substantial federal questions, the statement does not warrant further review.

ARGUMENT

I.

WHERE THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER I.C. §35-37-2-2(6) (BURNS REPL. 1985) WHICH REQUIRES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT EITHER A PARTY OR HIS ATTORNEY SIGN REQUESTED SPECIAL FINAL INSTRUCTIONS CONTRAVENES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT WAS NEITHER SPECIFICALLY RAISED AT TRIAL NOR DECIDED BY INDIANA APPELLATE COURTS, THE ISSUE IS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

After the presentation of evidence, the Petitioner tendered several special final instructions which the trial court refused. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Indiana declined to address the Petitioner's allegation of error regarding the refusal of the instructions since he failed to comply with I.C. §35-37-2-2(6) (Burns Repl. 1985) which reads in pertinent part:

> (6) If the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, or his counsel desires special instructions to be given to the jury, these instructions must be:
>
> (A) reduced to writing;
>
> (B) numbered;
>
> (C) signed by the party, or his attorney, who is requesting the special instructions; and
>
> (D) delivered to the court;
>
> before the commencement of the argument. A charge of the court or any special instructions, when written and given by the court under this subdivision, may not be orally qualified, modified, or in any manner orally explained to the jury by the court.

In his petition for rehearing to the Court of Appeals and in a petition for transfer to the Supreme Court of Indiana,

the Petitioner merely asserted that "Indiana Code §35-37-2-2(6) does not require each special instruction to be signed and, therefore, [the issue was] not waived." The petitions were denied by the appellate courts. In his jurisdictional statement, however, the Petitioner argues that I.C. 35-37-2-2(6) contravenes his rights guaranteed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 14-18).

The United States Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review the Petitioner's current contention since the constitutionality of I.C. §35-37-2-2(6) was not raised, briefed, or argued in the Indiana appellate courts. *State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel*, 324 U.S. 154, 160, 65 S.Ct. 573, 576 (1944). *See also Hill v. California*, 401 U.S. 797, 805-806, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 1111-1112 (1971). Indeed, in *Cardinale v. Louisiana*, 394 U.S. 437, 439, 89 S.Ct. 1161, 1163 (1969), the Supreme Court indicated the desirability of allowing state courts to determine the constitutionality of state statutes in light of a federal constitutional challenge since this not only assures an adequate record, but also gives the states the first opportunity to provide a definitive interpretation of their statutes.

In addition, when the highest state court does not examine an issue, it is presumed that the omission is due to lack of proper presentation unless the aggrieved party can affirmatively show the contrary. *Fuller v. Oregon*, 417 U.S. 40, 50 n.11, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 2123 n.11 (1974) quoting *Street v. New York*, 394 U.S. 576, 582, 89 S.Ct. 1354, 1360 (1969). No such showing has been made in this case. Since the constitutionality of I.C. §35-37-2-2(6) was not raised, briefed, or argued in the Indiana appellate courts, review by the United States Supreme Court is precluded. *Bailey v. Anderson*, 326 U.S. 203, 206-207, 66 S.Ct. 66, 68 (1945).

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY OVERRULING THE PETITIONER'S OBJECTION TO TRIAL BEFORE A SIX-PERSON JURY WHICH WAS BASED UPON THE ASSERTION THAT THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF I.C. § 35-37-1-1 (BURNS REPL. 1985) WHICH PROVIDES FOR A SIX-MEMBER JURY VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS

The Petitioner was indicted on September 3, 1982 for a theft committed in 1978. In 1978, I.C. §35-1-30-1 (1977) provided for a twelve-member jury in the trial of Class D felonies. On September 1, 1982, I.C. §35-37-1-1 (Burns Repl. 1985) became effective and authorized six-member juries. Prior to trial, the Petitioner filed a motion for a twelve-member jury which was denied. In his jurisdictional statement, the Petitioner argues that his trial by a jury of six persons was in violation of the constitutional prohibition against *ex post facto* laws, Article 1, §10 of the United States Constitution, because at the time the theft was committed, he had the right to be tried by a jury of twelve (Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 18-24).

An *ex post facto* law is a legislative act relating to criminal matters, retroactive in operation, which alters the situation of an accused to his disadvantage, or deprives him of some lawful protection to which he is entitled. The *ex post facto* prohibition, however, is applicable only where a substantive right is taken away and not where there is merely a change in procedure. *Portley v. Grossman*, 440 U.S. 1311, 100 S.Ct. 714 (1980).

In *Thompson v. Utah*, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S.Ct. 620 (1898), a case relied upon by the Petitioner, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a change in the law by Utah which reduced the number of jurors for a trial subsequent to the offense for which the trial was to be held was

unconstitutional as an *ex post facto* law when the offense had been committed while Utah was a territory and subject only to federal law. The Supreme Court concluded that the new statute "belongs to that class which by its necessary operation and 'in its relation to the offense, or its consequences, alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage'." *Id.* at 351, 18 S.Ct. at 623. The Supreme Court further stated:

> ...a statute that takes from the accused a *substantial right* given to him by the law in force at the time to which his guilt relates would be ex post facto in its nature and operation, and ... legislation of that kind cannot be sustained simply because, in a general sense, it may be said to regulate procedure.
>
> *Id.*, at 352, 18 S.Ct. at 623, (Emphasis added).

Later, in *Williams v. Florida*, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a jury of six persons is constitutional but did not overrule *Thompson* on the *ex post facto* issue. *Williams*, however, did not contain the *ex post facto* aspects present in *Thompson*. Therefore, *Thompson* could not have been specifically overruled in *Williams*. Nevertheless, in *Williams*, 399 U.S. at 101, 90 S.Ct. at 1906, the Court stated that "neither currently available evidence nor theory suggests that the 12-man jury is necessarily more advantageous to the defendant than a jury composed of fewer members."

Since *Williams* and its progeny, a jury of twelve is no longer considered a constitutional right, is not deemed to offer any advantage to a defendant, and is not substantial. Thus, in the instant case, I.C. §35-37-1-1 which reduced the jury's size from twelve to six did not take away a substantial right, but operated "only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to ... [the Petitioner's] disadvantage." See *Beazell*

v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68 (1925).[1] The Petitioner was subjected only to a change in procedure and no *ex post facto* prohibition was involved.

III.

SINCE THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO RAISE A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION REGARDING HIS CLAIM THAT THE INDICTMENT IS VAGUE, REVIEW BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IS PRECLUDED

The Petitioner was charged as follows:

> The Grand Jurors of Lake County, in the State of Indiana, good and lawful men, duly and legally impaneled, charged and sworn to inquire into felonies and certain misdemeanors in and for the body of said County of Lake, in the name and by the authority of the State of Indiana, on their oaths present that one ALBERT T. WILLARDO, M.D. of said County, on the January 1, 1978 through December 31, 1978, inclusive, at said County and State aforesaid, did then and there did knowingly or intentionally exert

---

[1] In *Beazell v. Ohio*, 369 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68 (1925), the Supreme Court considered a change in the law which resulted in joint trials of defendants who would otherwise have been entitled to separate trials. The Court determined that this was not an *ex post facto* violation since "statutory changes in the mode of trial...which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage are not prohibited." *Id.* at 170, 46 S.Ct. at 69. In addition, in *Maxwell v. Dow*, 176 U.S. 581, 605, 20 S.Ct. 448, 472, (1900), the Supreme Court referred to the propriety of an eight-member jury as a procedural matter:

> [T]he state has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution. The legislation in question is not, in our opinion, open to either of these objections.

> unauthorized control in a manner or to an extent other than that to which the other person has consented over property of Lake County, Indiana, a body politic or corporate, to-wit: money from the Lake County, Indiana, Coroner's Budget (Calendar Year 1978) Account Number 001-070-00213 (Traveling Expenses), with the intent to deprive the said Lake County, Indiana, a body politic or corporate, of the value and use thereof...

Prior to trial, the Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment which was based upon the assertion that the indictment failed to state the offense with certainty. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Indiana, the Petitioner stated (Petitioner's Appendix at A-30):

> While it is true that some latitude should be permitted, in regard to certainty, a child could have done a better job of drafting. No one charged in this fashion could read this and understand what he was charged with. It was obviously hurriedly drawn just before the Special Grand Jury expired, and thereafter the State could not amend the indictment as far as substance. Dr. Willardo timely filed his Motion to Dismiss on those grounds, but it was denied by the Court without comment.

The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the Petitioner's claim and ruled that he failed to specifically state in what manner the indictment was deficient (Petitioner's Appendix at A-31). In his jurisdictional statement, the Petitioner alleges that the indictment was vague and should have been dismissed (Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 24-25).

An indictment is sufficient if it contains the elements of the offense charged, fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and finally, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. *Hamling v. United*

States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (1974). In his jurisdictional statement, the Petitioner again fails to specify in what manner the indictment is deficient.

Moreover, the Petitioner has not raised a substantial federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257. Although the jurisdictional statement contains a mere reference to the Fifth Amendment, this is insufficient to support a claim that the amendment has been violated. Indeed, as stated in *Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County*, 166 U.S. 684, 17 S.Ct. 709, 711 (1897): "the jurisdiction of this court to re-examine the final judgment of a state court cannot arise from mere inference, but only from averments so distinct and positive as to place it beyond question that the party bringing a case here from such court intended to assert a federal right." Since the Petitioner has failed to raise a substantial federal question regarding his claim that the indictment is vague, review by the United States Supreme Court is precluded.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Respondent, the State of Indiana, respectfully requests that the jurisdictional statement be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

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No. 85-871

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JAN 22 1986
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1985

ALBERT T. WILLARDO, M.D.
Appellant-Petitioner herein

vs.

STATE OF INDIANA
Appellee- Respondent herein

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA AND CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

REPLY OF APPELLANT-PETITIONER DR. WILLARDO TO STATE OF INDIANA'S MOTION TO DISMISS JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

For Appeal: I.

(1) Whether a State statute requiring counsel to individually sign jury instructions and which is used to deny Petitioner's right to review on certain issues where the instructions were not so individually signed is repugnant to the guarantee of the fundamental right to due process of law as established by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

In the event appeal is not granted as to question (1), it is prayed that the Court then grant writ of certiorari as to question (1).

For writ of certiorari: II.

(2) Whether the trial Court's holding that a state statute taking effect two years following the claimed

offense and reducing the number of jurors from twelve to six in Petitioner's trial on a criminal offense of theft violates the ex post facto provisions of Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.

III.

(3) Whether a criminal indictment failing to state the alleged offense with sufficient certainty so as to leave the Petitioner to guess how, when, where and with whom in calendar year 1978 an alleged offense occurred is so vague as to violate the guarantee of Petitioner's fundamental right to due process of law as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Askew v. State
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Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board
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Rule 17.1 (b) . . . . . p 11, 17

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FOREWARD

Appellant-Petitioner Dr. Albert T. Willardo by his counsel hereby timely files his Reply Brief in Opposition to the State's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 16.5. This brief is to be read in conjunction with and supplementary to the original Petition.

We also ask that the original Petition and this pleading be addressed to both the Indiana Court of Appeals whose Opinion we challenge and to the Supreme Court of Indiana which was the last court to render any form of decision in this case. According to Indiana Rule II (B) (4) of Appellate Procedure, the litigation between the parties terminated in that court.

ADDENDA

In the Authorities section of the original Petition, Carolina Dept. of Highways v. Barnwell is corrected to read South Carolina Dept. of Highways v. Barnwell Bros.

The case cited herein as Bryant v. Zimmerman is sometimes cited as New York ex rel Bryant v. Zimmerman or State ex rel Bryant v. Zimmerman. The common form is used.

We point out that the statement of the question on p. 4 of the State's Motion to Dismiss is incorrect as the Indiana Court of Appeals decided that question against Appellant and in favor of the State, which is why we challenge the application of that statute in this Court. That the question was not raised at trial is correct as the State first

raised it on appeal in Appellee's Brief on page 25.

FACTS

The facts are as stated in the Petition and are hereby incorporated by reference. We add that Dr. Willardo as Coroner of a large county delegated much administrative authority and that his testimony in the record shows lack of intent to defraud, mistake of fact, and that jury instructions were not given in this regard. Also, the conviction resulted from an erroneous statement of the law of embezzlement as found in Instruction No. 14 ((Appendix E @ A-37)).

ARGUMENT

I.

WHETHER A STATE STATUTE REQUIRING COUNSEL TO INDIVIDUALLY SIGN JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND WHICH IS USED TO DENY PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO REVIEW ON CERTAIN ISSUES WHERE THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT SO INDIVIDUALLY SIGNED IS REPUGNANT TO THE GUARANTEE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS ESTABLISHED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

The Federal Constitutional Question Was Adaquetely and Timely Raised.

The State's Motion to Dismiss the Jurisdictional Statement ((hereinafter Motion to Dismiss)) states @ p.4. That the federal question was not raised at trial which is correct as IC 35-37-2-2 (6) was first raised in Appellee's Brief p. 25. The application of that statute, of which we complain in this Court was argued against in Appellant's Reply Br. at p5-7 and especially in Brief of Appellant in Support of His Petition to Transfer p. 19 "fundamental fairness" and

especially on p. 20 "due process", "fundamental right", "fundamental error", and that "procedural requirements must give way to the fundamental principles of due process". By not granting the Petition for Transfer, the Supreme Court of Indiana was the last court to give an adverse ruling on this due process issue.

Although former counsel might have used more magic words and phrases, the constitutional issue was timely raised and the unconstitutional application of IC 35-37-2-2 (6) was timely responded to. Cases cited by the State in its Motion to Dismiss p. 5 deal with matters where the constitutional question was first raised in the Petition or in oral argument in this Court, and are not

applicable in this case.

Also, Instruction No. 14 ((Appendix E @ A-37)) was objected to essentially on due process grounds where it was challenged by other tendered instructions, on the Motion to Correct Errors R. Vol. IV pp. 858ff and argument thereon, and in every brief filed by Dr. Willardo's counsel. This instruction held misappropriation to be synonomous with embezzlement, which is not the law~Hart v. State, 220 Ind 469 @486/44 N.E.2d 346 @ 354 (1942). It defined a criminal offense in terms of something not a criminal offense. This constitutes fundamental error which can be reviewed by this Court of its own motion Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 US 199 @206 (1962) and Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 US

478 dissent @483 (1974).

Where specific intent is an essential element of an offense, failure to give that instruction or to instruct as to each element of the offense is reversible error Ridge v. State, 192 Ind 639 @644-45/ 137 NE 758 @759 (1922) and Morrissette v. United States, 342 US 246 @274 (1952). These points are raised to show that due process arguments were raised throughout and that the errors complained of were reversible, substantial, and often fundamental so that IC 35-37-2-2 (6) as applied by the Indiana Court of Appeals and as not corrected by the Supreme Court of Indiana allowing erroneous instructions to go uncorrected and correct instructions to be waived violated

Dr. Willardo's rights to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.

State Statute Can Be Challenged as Unconstitutional In Its Application.

A state statute may be challenged as unconstitutional in its application Dahnke Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 US 282 @289/66 L Ed 234 @243 (1921). In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886) a city safety ordinance fair on its face was found to violate equal protection when applied only to Chinamen so as to deny them a livelihood @373-74. More to the point, in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 US 284 (1973) state evidentiary and procedural rules denying the defendant the right to cross-examine his own witness and not allowing him to introduce certain

exculpatory evidence were found to violate due process @294-95, 297, 303. There, the State failed to balance its interests in procedure against the individual's rights to due process of law. This is precisely what occurred here with Dr. Willardo.

Federal Question Can Be Raised Imprecisely But With Clear Intendment.

Although it may be inexplicit, the federal question may be raised by clear intendment in the state courts below- Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board, 347 US 590 @599/98 L Ed 967 @977 (1953); Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 US 63 @67 (1928) and Street v. New York, 394 US 576 @ 584 (1969) which quotes Bryant

No particular form of words or

> phrases is essential, but only that the claim of invalidity and the ground therefor be brought to the attention of the state court with fair precision and in due time. And if the record as a whole shows either expressly or by clear intendment that this was done, the claim is to be regarded as having been adaquetely presented.

That has occurred here ((SUPRA)). The constitutional question was raised here far more clearly than in Braniff 347 US 0599 where a claim of no taxable situs was held to raise the question of due process or in Largent v. Texas, 318 US 418 (1943) where a motion to quash citing the 14th Amendment 0419-20 was held sufficient to raise 1st Amendment issues applicable to the state throught the 14th Amendment.

State Courts Need Not Explicitly Decide the Constitutional Question.

The constitutional claim need not be decided explicitly in the state courts.

In Braniff v. Nebraska State Board 347 US 590 the state court decided the wrong constitutional question, namely, commerce clause instead of due process. In Lawrence v. State Tax Comm, 286 US 276 (1932) the state courts reached their decision on an unsubstantial and illusory state ground 282-83 which happended in the present case. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 US 60 holds that the ruling need not be put in direct terms, that "if the necessary effect of the judgment has been to deny the claim, that is enough" 367. This occurred here in the opinion of the Appellate Court and in the Indiana Supreme Court's denial of Petition to Transfer.

Jurisdiction Is Proper.

Jurisdiction is proper for this Court to grant appeal under 28 USC § 1257 (2) and for reasons given and cases cited above. The State's Motion to Dismiss under Supreme Court Rule 16.1 is improper and should be denied. In the alternative certiorari could be granted under 28 USC § 1257 (3), possibly 28 USC § 2103; and Supreme Court Rule 17.1 (c) and cases cited above and in the Petition.

We also note that the situation in Askew v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1350 (Ind. 1982) has repeated itself in Harding v. State 457 N.E.2d 1098 & 1101 (Ind. 1984), in the present case, and is capable of repetition.

II.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING THAT A STATE STATUTE TAKING EFFECT TWO YEARS FOLLOWING THE CLAIMED OFFENSE AND REDUCING THE NUMBER OF OF JURORS FROM TWELVE TO SIX IN PETITIONER'S TRIAL ON A CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF THEFT VIOLATES THE EX POST FACTO PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The State's argument here goes more to the merits of the case than to the jurisdiction of this Court to grant certiorari on this question. The federal constitutional question was raised at all stages of state court proceedings below and was ruled upon adversely at all times.

We add that Thompson v. Utah, 170 US 343 (1898) has never been overruled as has been stated in Isoton v. State, 472 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. App. 1984) concurrence @653; that state courts taking a position adverse to our own

fail to understand the difference between "ex post facto" and "due process", that Thompson 170 US 0355 held the greater number of jurors at the time of the offense to be a substantive right; and that the triggering events in an "ex post facto" case of this type are the time of the offense and the time of trial 170 US 0355 and not merely the time of trial as believed in Iseton 472 N.E.2d concurrence 0653.

Jurisdiction is Proper.

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 USC § 1257 (3) and Supreme Court Rule 17.1 (b) and cases cited in the Petition 018-19 and Rule 17.1 (c) and Thompson 170 US 343. We should note that as states reduce the number of jurors, this situation is capable of repetition.

III.

WHETHER A CRIMINAL INDICTMENT FAILING TO STATE THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WITH SUFFICIENT CERTAINTY SO AS TO LEAVE THE PETITIONER TO GUESS HOW, WHEN, WHERE AND WITH WHOM IN CALENDAR YEAR 1978 AN ALLEGED OFFENSE OCCURRED IS SO VAGUE AS TO VIOLATE THE GUARANTEE OF PETITIONER'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS SET FORTH IN THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Former trial counsel made timely objection to the vagueness of the Indictment ((Appendix F @A-38)) on grounds of vagueness and inability to formulate a defense. Although the prosecution might have cured this problem with a bill of particulars or something similar, it did not do so, and the trial judge held the indictment to be good.

A reading of said indictment will show that it is vague, void for vagueness, fails to convey any information enabling

a defendant to defend, and the reader might well ask himself if he would like to be tried on an indictment that vague. This brings into play the fundamental error doctrine of Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 US 0206 and Vachan v. New Hampshire 414 US dissent 0483 ((both SUPRA)).

Constitutional Question Raised in State Court.

That the constitutional question has been properly raised in state court and how that can happen has been argued already in the Question for Appeal in the sections dealing with "clear intendment" and that the state court need not decide the federal question explicitly but only that the judgment have adverse effect ((SUPRA)). A due process argument has been raised throughout.

The argument was that the Indictment failed to state the offense with certainty so that Defendant lacked adequate notice and was unable to formulate an adequate defense. This was timely raised before trial on a motion to dismiss, on the Motion to Correct Errors and argument thereon R.V. IV pp 858ff, Appellant's Brief pp 20-21; Reply Brief pp 3-4, and Brief of Appellant in Support of His Petition to Transfer p. 16.

The State's Motion to Dismiss p. 9 cites the Court of Appeals Opinion at A-31 asking in what manner the Indictment was deficient and also cites Hamling v. United States 09-10. We will deal with Hamling a bit later. The Reply Brief p. 3-4 cites the entire

calendar year of 1978 as vague, no statement of specific acts, or how others were involved. The Reply Brief cited Fadell v. State, 450 N.E.2d (Ind. App. 1983) where one count of conviction was reversed for failure of the indictment to state what people were involved and, essentially, how #115. The same three judges who decided Fadell failed to follow their own ruling in this case. That court did note that the one year time period could have prejudiced an alibi defense A-12 and indicated that an attack might have been made on "sufficiendy of the evidence itself" #A-32 but failed to follow up on these points. The latter point would come under fundamental error ((SUPRA)).

Appellant-Petitioner did raise a due

process question under the Fourteenth Amendment in the state courts as stated above, and also in this Court in his Petition 24-25 where cases decide 5th Amendment due process using the same standard applicable to the 14th Amendment. All this goes well beyond the "more inference" the State alludes to in its Motion to Dismiss p. 10.

In addition McDonald v. Mabee, 243 US 90 (1917) views due process as "fair play" 91 and "substantial justice" 92. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 US 457 (1940) focuses on notice and opportunity to be heard 463. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 US 284, a criminal case, focused on notice and opportunity to defend. None of this was present in the indictment complained of.

Interestingly, Hamling v. United States, 418 US 87 (1974) holds an indictment valid when it tells "where", "how", "whom", and "by what mean" 391. None of that happended in the instant case.

The State seems to believe that the Indictment was fair and that the prosecution played fairly throughout. One might read R.V. I pp. 170ff and the interesting affidavit R.V. IV pp 866-869.

Jurisdiction is Proper.

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 USC § 1257 (3) and Supreme Court Rule 17.1 (c) and cases cited in Petition p. 24 and above.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Petitioner-Appellant Dr. Willardo prays that Appeal be granted on the first question or, in the alternative, that writ of certiorari issue. He also prays that this Court grant writ of certiorari on the second and third questions for reasons set forth in the Petition and also herein. Finally, he prays that the State's Motion to Dismiss Jurisdictional Statement be denied.

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